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Abstract
The criminalization of Muslims—framing an Islamic religious identity as a problem to
be solved using state crime control logic—is undeniably in process in the United
States. Local, state, and federal statutes target Muslims for surveillance and exclusion,
and media sources depict Muslims as synonymous with terrorism, as others have
shown. This paper analyzes the public’s role in the criminalization of Islam, which I
call “cr-Islamization.” Drawing on in-depth, qualitative interviews in a major Southwest city during the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, I detail how the
majority of 144 politically, racially, and economically diverse interviewees talk about
Muslims as a potential “racial threat,” using “fear of crime” language indicative of the
mass incarceration era. This suggests that criminalization theory should be central to
sociological studies of Muslims in the contemporary United States, and that criminalization rhetoric remains powerful, despite mainstream enthusiasm for criminal justice
reform. I argue that criminalization’s power might reside in its ability to mutate in
the “post-racial” era. The mechanisms supporting crimmigration, the criminalization of
black Americans, and cr-Islamization are related but not identical. Muslims are
religiously and racially subjugated, but more economically secure compared to other
criminalized groups. This paper’s findings should prompt scholars to re-examine the
relationships between racialization, criminalization, religious subjugation, and economic exploitation in the twenty-first century United States.
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In August 2016, I was running a small focus group in a major Southwest city. My colleagues
and I were looking to answer two questions: What did Americans think about the 2016
presidential candidates’ statements about Muslims? And how did they impact the public’s
understanding of the religion of Islam? That afternoon, one participant who I’ll call Karen, was
reluctant to talk. She had marked “very liberal” on her participant survey, and I assumed she
agreed with the three more vocal members of her group. They were using metaphors that we
would hear repeatedly in our large-scale interview project: Trump was scapegoating Muslims,
his proposal to ban Muslims was bringing out Americans’ racism, and it was similar to other
examples of bias against minority groups in U.S. history. Eventually I asked Karen if she had
anything to add, and she said that she didn’t want to “sound like a crazed Trump person,”
which she was “totally not,” but that she felt like she had come to her position honestly. For
three years, she explained, she and her husband had lived in a small village in South Asia,
working for a health services organization with a population that was majority Muslim. She
explained:
I can say that people who were highly educated were horrible people when they were
speaking privately ... they would forget that my husband wasn’t one of them because he
also spoke the language so they spoke completely freely in front of him and then he
would tell me what they said. They were horrible people. Towards women, towards
Jews, towards Westerners, towards each other.
Growing increasingly vitriolic, she continued:
We had people who, I don’t want to call them friends, but we spent time with them, who
were in blood feuds, which meant they killed other people, and then they would get visas
to the U.S. and settle in the U.S. because they didn’t want to be killed in their turn.
Karen then turned to her groupmates. She said it was “naïve of Americans to think that
Muslims are 99% peaceful,” and that all Americans should be grappling with a major
question: “What does a tolerant society do with an intolerant element?” The others appeared
shocked, and struggled to provide counter arguments. Karen had essentialized the more than
1.7 billion Muslims who make up approximately one quarter of the world’s population as
intolerant and violent. Despite identifying as politically liberal, her generalization obscured
differences in nationality, ethnicity, political beliefs, schools of theology, and level of
religious commitment, among others. Karen’s call to protect Americans from Muslims is
a view that was isolated in “fringe” political groups in the U.S. until well after 9/11 (Bail
2012, 2015), explained by sociologists as a remnant of ethno-, racial, and religious Orientalism (Asad 2007; Bail 2012, 2015; Braunstein 2017; Cainkar 2002, 2009; Cainkar and
Selod 2018; Casanova 2011; Cesari 2013; Considine 2017; Garner and Selod 2015; Love
2017; Meer 2013; Mondon and Winter 2017; Peek 2005; Selod 2018; Selod and Embrick
2013; Shams 2018; Silva 2017; Turner and Nasir 2013; Williams 2013; Zopf 2017). But this
paper argues that Americans’ contemporary beliefs about Muslims should also be sited as
part of the U.S. history of criminalization. Karen, along with more than half of our 144
interviewees, spoke of Muslims as people that non-Muslim Americans should fear. The
criminalization of Muslims—which I call “cr-Islamization”—by people across the political
spectrum, demonstrates both the relevance and the mutability of “fear of crime” talk in the
twenty-first century. Although the mass incarceration of racialized Americans is declining
according to some (cf. Clear and Frost 2014), this paper joins others in suggesting that
criminalization is mutating rather than diminishing (cf. Beckett et al. 2016 et al.).
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The U.S. is relatively late to mainstream discrimination against Muslims compared to Europe
(Bulut 2016; Cesari 2013; Mondon and Winter 2017), and Islam in the United States has only
recently been centralized as a concern for sociologists of race and ethnicity. Scholars have shown
that Muslim and those imagined to be Muslim in the twenty-first century U.S. experience homogenization and subordination similar to other racialized groups (Bayoumi 2006; Cainkar 2009;
Cainkar and Selod 2018; Considine 2017; Garner and Selod 2015; Love 2017; Meer 2013; Meer
and Modood 2010; Peek 2005; Selod 2015, 2018; Selod and Embrick 2013; Shams 2018;
Zainiddinov 2016; Zopf 2017). This paper confirms that Muslims are imagined to be a racial group
in the twenty-first century United States, but argues that this racialization is a specific type. In-depth
interviews with 144 people show how Muslims are spoken about using “racial threat” talk—a
technique of the mass incarceration era—which simultaneously subjugates and poses crime control
solutions to problems ascribed to blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. (Blalock 1967; Bobo and
Hutchings 1996; Eitle et al. 2002). Muslims therefore join African Americans and Hispanic migrants
in the late modern canon of racialized-criminalized populations, talked about as object of the “fear of
crime” rhetoric that helped construct the mass incarceration era.
This work is significant for a number of reasons. First, my collaborators and I interviewed
everyday Americans just prior to the Trump presidency. Our research shows that Americans were
primed for President Trump’s “Muslim ban” that barred visitors from Muslim-majority nations, held
to be constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2018. As a sociological “event” (Sewell Jr.
1996) of some import in the history of U.S. immigration policy, the “Muslim ban” should not be
viewed as driven solely by its author, but also as the manifestation of already circulating prejudices.
Second, situating cr-Islamization in tandem with other racialized groups imagined to be dangerous
“others” from whom “innocent” Americans need protection, illuminates its stakes. Muslims in the
United States do not occupy the same socio-economic milieu as other criminalized populations.
Thus, Muslim threat talk is both similar to and different from previous incarnations of fear of crime
discourse. Feared to have bodies inherently dangerous like black and Hispanic Americans, Muslims
are also spoken about as an organized and sophisticated ideological threat to American “culture.”
This has implications for criminalization theory in the supposedly post-racial era (Bonilla-Silva
2014). As Christian hegemony continues to decline in the U.S. (Jones 2016), sociologists who study
crime, race, and religion should use the conceptual tools of criminalization to interrogate Muslim
subjugation on the one hand; and gain insight on resistance from groups who have struggled against
such subjugation on the other. Including Muslims in the cannon of criminalized populations opens
up new territory for exploring and critiquing “fear of crime.” Previously tied to economically
disadvantaged populations in the U.S., this case suggests criminalization discourse is mutating.

Muslims and the “West”
On December 7, 2015, almost a year before he was elected President of the United States, Donald
Trump released a statement saying that he would ban all foreign Muslims from entering the country
as part of his plan to fight terrorism. In an interview, he explained: “It has nothing to do with religion,
it’s about safety.”1 As my colleagues and I embarked on a large-scale interview project to understand
the impact of the candidates’ statements on Islam, we assumed the reactions to this proposal would
1

Interview transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-insists-muslim-ban-safetyreligion/story?id=35666498. Despite this disclaimer, discourse analysis reveals anti-Muslim rhetoric throughout
Trump’s campaign (Khan et al. 2019).
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be interesting but not necessarily historically important, as Hillary Clinton was predicted to become
President. The significance of our research only became apparent later, first when Trump was sworn
in as the President, and again when his newly-reconfigured U.S. Supreme Court upheld his
executive order banning foreign nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen.2
Islam’s perceived “incompatibility” with the West is not new. Social scientists explain
“Western” views on Muslims at the intersection of politics, religion, and race. Said (1978) first
documented how Orientalism was produced by the Western gaze. Colonial forays into Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East popularized the notion that “Oriental” people were inferior, underdeveloped, sly, and untrustworthy. That is to say that Muslims, or more precisely, people
perceived to be Muslim are not just beginning to experience discrimination in the United States.
While scholars have documented how religious Muslims, Arab-Americans, Sikhs, women
wearing head coverings, and others have been the targets of anti-Muslim harassment especially
since 9/11 but also before (Aseltine 2014; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009; Cainkar 2002, 2009;
Cainkar and Maira 2005; Hamm 2013; Jamal and Naber 2008; Joshi 2006; Love 2017; Meer and
Modood 2010; Rana 2011; Selod 2018; Singh 2002; Zopf 2017), the idea that Islam is dangerous
has had a more recent renaissance.3 Samuel Huntington (1993) ushered into U.S. conservative
foreign policy circles the notion that Islam is incompatible with the “West,” in what is now called
the “clash of civilizations” thesis. Huntington (1993) argued that Islamic “culture” is so antagonistic
to “Western” culture that U.S. foreign policy should draw boundaries around allies and enemies
according to this division.4 The “clash of civilization” rhetoric was isolated in fringe organizations
during the 1990s, but in the wake of 9/11, the media’s search for expertise on Islam provided
platforms for such marginal voices (Bail 2015). In 2016, with the Trump administration, formerly
fringe notions about Islam also moved into the White House. Michael Flynn and Sebastian Gorka,
both of whom occupied positions of influence in Trump’s administration, are also prominent
members of what the Southern Poverty Law Center calls “anti-Islamic hate groups.”5
Sociologists have explained this recent shift with theories of racialization. Using Omi and
Winant’s (1994) frame of extending a racial definition to a “previously racially unclassified
group,” scholars show that Americans who are thought to be Muslim, experience ostracization
and hostility (Cainkar 2009; Cainkar and Selod 2018; Considine 2017; Elver 2012; Garner and
Selod 2015; Jamal and Naber 2008; Love 2017; Meer 2013; Meer and Modood 2010; Nader
2006; Nasser 2013; Peek 2005; Rana 2011; Selod 2015, 2018; Selod and Embrick 2013;
Zainiddinov 2016; Zopf 2017).6 But this racialization literature does not capture the meaningmaking accomplished by those doing the racialization.
2

The full text of this ban available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/09/27/2017-20899
/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes-for-detecting-attempted-entry-into-the-united-states-by. It also
bans North Koreans, as well as Venezuelan officials and their families.
3
There is substantial sociological literature on the perception of Arab-Americans and those perceived to be
“Middle Eastern” in the United States, both before and after 9/11. This is related to, but not synonymous with the
perception of Muslims. Like Muslims, Arabs and Middle Easterners are imagined as potentially violent enemies
of the United States. But narratives surrounding Arabs and Middle Easterners work differently, in part because of
the discourse surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the “model minority myth” that historically racializes
Arabs as white (cf. Cainkar 2009; and Jamal and Naber 2008).
4
Not incidentally, Huntington’s ideas borrow heavily from Orientalist historian Bernard Lewis (1990).
5
See the complete list at: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/anti-muslim
6
Perceptions of black Muslims in the United States have a different history. Between 15 and 30% of African
slaves were estimated to be Muslim upon arrival in the U.S. (Austin 1997), and the Nation of Islam, formed in the
first decades of the twentieth century as part of the black nationalist movement, still has tens of thousands of
active members today. Contemporary Muslim racialization is entwined with the history of Orientalism and more
specifically the anti-Arab prejudices of late twentieth century.
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Criminalization, I argue, best describes non-Muslim Americans’ imaginings of Muslims in the
early Trump era. Criminalization takes place when a social issue or group is shifted into a category
of problems to be solved using the logic and structure of state crime control (Jenness 2004).
Governing bodies are prime actors in this process. As other scholars have demonstrated, Muslims
have suffered through broad-scale treatment as potential criminals, especially in the wake of 9/11.
Muslims have been targeted for surveillance and detention (Ali 2016; Kamali 2017; Modood et.
al. 2006; Razak 2008; Selod 2018; Shams 2018; Shiek 2011) and received enhanced punishments
in prisons (Aseltine 2014). Islamic or “Sharia” law has been banned by a dozen state courts
(Mitchell and Toner 2016; Patel et al. 2013), and most recently foreign nationals from majority
Islamic countries have been excluded from the United States altogether. As such, Muslims have
been veritably “cast out” from Western legal systems following 9/11 (Razack 2008).
But state actors do not operate in a vacuum. Criminalization relies on the circulation of beliefs
and ideas throughout the public sphere. For one, experts and interest groups in prime social
locations—sometimes called “moral entrepreneurs” (Becker 1963)—supply frames that successfully resonate in media, political, and public discourse in service of criminalization (Hall et al.
1978). Especially since the publication of Huntington’s (1993) “Clash of Civilization,” Muslims
in the United States have become the purview of such entrepreneurs. Right-wing Christian
organizations (Bail 2012, 2015; Emerson and Smith 2000) and political actors (Braunstein
2017; Coen 2017; Khan et al. 2019; Mueller 2009) have positioned Muslims as a problem to
be solved. Accomplishing criminalization also necessitates the participation of the media and
public (Ferrell 1999; Ferrell et al. 2015; Hall et al. 1978). Indeed, Muslims are portrayed in the
American media as potential terrorists (Altheide 2006; Morey 2010; Nacos and Torres-Reyna
2003; Silva 2017), part of what Morgan and Poynting (2012) argue is the construction of Muslims
as “transnational folk devils” in Western political discourse.
This paper builds on the research about the public’s role in criminalization, bringing
Americans’ everyday meaning-making about Muslims into focus. Black and Hispanic people
in the U.S. have been the prime targets of public and state criminalization. In the era of mass
incarceration, criminalization has depended on the circulation of public “fear of crime” as an
ongoing concern. Described as an “epidemic” (Glassner 1999), scholars demonstrate how fear
of crime has organized U.S. culture (Garland 2001), governance (Simon 2007), community
(Sasson 1995), politics (Beckett and Sasson 2004), and media (Glassner 1999) in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century.
Surveys suggest that the American public consider Muslims to be a potential “racial threat”
as well (Kalkan et al. 2009; Lajevardi and Ooskoii 2018; Panagopoulos 2006; Sides and Gross
2013). Stemming from Blumer’s (1958) theory of “group threat,” the racial threat thesis links
minority resentment with hegemonic vulnerability: members of dominant groups express
insecurity by constructing less dominant groups as threatening. This has been used to explain
why Americans have supported policies that criminalize racial minorities in the build-up of
mass incarceration. Whether the threat is perceived to be African American (Bobo and
Hutchings 1996; Chiricos et al. 2001; Eitle et al. 2002; King and Wheelock 2007; Liska
1992) or Hispanic (Stewart et al. 2015; Wang 2012; Welch et al. 2011; Wang 2012), white
Americans who experience vulnerability demonstrate increased support for crime control
policies as a response to this fear. Fears associated with “racial threat” have multiple dimensions. Americans fear not only physical violence, but also losing economic and political
supremacy (See Stewart et al. 2015: 72–74 for a review of racial threat studies.) Indeed,
surveys from soon after 9/11 have shown that Muslims belong in this canon. Americans
perceive Muslims to be a threat due to their racial and cultural “otherness” (Kalkan et al. 2009;
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Panagopoulos 2006) because they are untrustworthy and potentially violent (Sides and Gross
2013); and because of what Lajevardi and Ooskoii (2018) call “blatant racism,” or the assumption
that Muslims are biologically inferior, less evolved than “white” Americans. Surveys also find that
Americans think Muslims are intelligent and hard-working (Sides and Gross 2013).
Such quantitative work demonstrates the relevance of the “threat” narrative, but does little
to explain how Americans construct Islam on their own terms. The present study’s inductive
method allows respondents to supply the language through which they build meaning. Our
respondents “try on” positions about Islam in the United States, discursively situating their
beliefs about Muslims through “fear of crime” discourse. Muslims are spoken about as a
homogenous, threatening population on the one hand, and in need of state crime control
measures on the other. This construction places Muslims in the canon of American populations
that have been both racialized and criminalized. It also reveals the ongoing importance of such
“fear of crime” talk, even in an era when criminal justice “reform” is ascendant.

Research Strategy
During the 2016 presidential election season—between May and October 2016—the author
and two collaborators worked with four undergraduate research assistants to interview adults in
a major southwestern city about the candidates’ stated positions on Muslims and Islam. We
wanted to understand the extent to which the candidates’ views were impacting the general
public. Previous literature suggests that in the United States, religious identity and political
affiliation most impact opinions about Islam. Those who say religion holds an important place
in their lives—and especially evangelical Christians—are most likely to believe Islam is
inherently dangerous, while people who report no religious affiliation are least likely to think
of Islam as threatening (Pew 2014; Sherkat and Lehman 2018). Registered Republicans are
also more concerned about “Islamic terrorism” than Democrats in the United States (Pew
2016). Our primary sampling goal therefore was to ensure a wide range of religious affiliations
and a spectrum of political identities.
To build our respondent pool, we used theory-driven, purposeful sampling (Morse 2007) in
combination with a “saturation” approach (Small 2009). We contacted and interviewed local
congregational leaders from major religions around the city. We then requested that leaders ask
members of their congregations to participate. By the end of our data collection period, we had
interviewed people from Baptist, Episcopal, Evangelical, “non-denominational” Christian,
Catholic, and Unitarian Universalist churches; Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox synagogues; a Sikh temple, three mosques, and a pagan group. We also targeted a variety of secular
civic organizations to assure the participation of people who are religiously non-affiliated.
These included students, faculty, and staff at three universities; members of two LGBTQ
political organizations; people affiliated with a nearby military base; staff and clients at a
refugee organization; senior citizens at a community center; and members of a national
organization whose goal is to protect “national security.” We proceeded using a snowball
method until major religious groups were relatively saturated, though we also agreed that we
could have continued mining our diverse respondent pool. The election in November determined our stopping point for data gathering, when all interviews and focus group recordings
were professionally transcribed.
Like Abrams et al. (2004) and others using a modified grounded theory approach (Glaser
and Strauss 1967), we were interested in capturing the way that meaning is created as
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important events unfold, recording “culture on the street” before positions become ossified in
policy (Abrams et al. 2004, 194, citing Williams 1977). Using semi-structured, open-ended
interviewing that aims to develop respondent-centered data (Weiss 1995), we tracked how
meaning is created, rather than imposing meaning ourselves. We asked all respondents
questions on four general topics:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What have you heard about Islam during the presidential campaign?
Does this conversation remind you of others in history?
How did you form your ideas about Islam?
Have you ever experienced fear around these issues?

We also made available three scenarios based on current events if interviewees needed examples
to prompt responses. The full interview schedule is appended to this paper. After initial pilot
interviews, we decided to add focus groups to our data collection strategy because we were
concerned that foreign nationals were less free with their speech compared to American nationals.
We employed a “mini” focus group methodology (Morgan 1997), arranging sessions with 2–5
people from shared social networks so that participants would be “highly involved” both with one
another and with the interview material.7 By adding these, we were able to capture the development of group knowledge, especially among people we thought would otherwise feel vulnerable
by exposing their opinions and experiences.8 We conducted 30 focus groups with a total of 89
people, and interviewed 83 people individually. In total, 172 people participated, with interviews
and focus groups ranging from 30 minutes to over two hours.
Twenty-four respondents identified as religiously Muslim, and are thus excluded from this
paper’s findings about Islam’s criminalization. This is not to suggest that Muslims would have a
uniform response to our questions (In fact, see Pew Research Center 2017 and Yukich 2018 for
the diversity of American Muslims’ reactions to Trump). Rather, Muslim respondents in our study
uniformly discussed the ways in which their communities were being spoken about, a different
discursive task than commenting on an imagined “other”. Their experiences are discussed in a
separate paper, Kaufman and Niner (2019). In addition, three non-Muslim respondents denied
having any knowledge of the ways in which Islam was being discussed during the election. One
of these was a foreign national, which prompted us to rethink our research strategy as discussed
above, and the other two were incoherent. The remaining 144 respondents’ answers are analyzed
below, with the help of a qualitative software analysis program, NVivo.
Along with interviews, we collected basic demographic data from respondents in order to
assure a variety of racial, ethnic, generational, and socioeconomic positions. Our respondents
reflect this diversity, coming from over half of the city’s zip codes. Table 1 shows that although
white, educated Democrats are over-represented, the 144 non-Muslim respondents are split
about evenly as to their political leaning, with about one-third of each reporting as (1) liberal or
“Mini groups” are defined in contrast to the standard group size of 6–10 that would have produced less in-depth
answers and interactions (Morgan 1997).
This is a typical strategy in studies using mixed methods interviews and focus groups. Wilkinson (1999) and
other feminist researchers argue that by allowing naturalistic group dynamics to develop, researchers inevitably
give up some level of control, therefore becoming less commanding. Focus groups promote ease of conversation
to mitigate a potentially inhibitory power dynamics and give access to beliefs and feelings that researchers might
miss. We used these, then, when we suspected researchers’ memberships in relatively privileged or outsider
groups would inhibit respondents: with Muslim foreign nationals and refugees especially. To balance the
potential for “group think” to influence our findings, we also continued to conduct one-on-one interviews.

7
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Table 1 Participant characteristics (N = 144)
Gender
Political Affiliation

Position on Fiscal Issues

Highest Degree Earned

Household Income

Religious Affiliation

Age

Race/Ethnicity

Female
Male
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Conservative or Very Conservative
Moderate
Liberal or Very Liberal
Current student
Less than High School
High school or GED
BA
Advanced Degree
Below $20 k
20–50
50–80
80–110
Above $110 k
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Atheist/Agnostic
Other
Sikh
70 and above
50–70
30–49
29 and below
White
Hispanic
Black
Asian
Middle Eastern

76 (52%)
68 (48%)
80 (55%)
28 (20%)
28 (20%)
50 (35%)
41 (28%)
51 (35%)
25 (17%)
3 (2%)
26 (18%)
40 (28%)
48 (33%)
11 (8%)
21 (15%)
27 (19%)
25 (18%)
38 (26%)
57 (40%)
21 (15%)
20 (14%)
6 (4%)
5 (4%)
4 (3%)
29 (20%)
53 (37%)
26 (18%)
39 (27%)
82 (57%)
36 (25%)
11 (8%)
6 (4%)
4 (3%)

As is typical in survey research, some respondents left blank or supplied write-in answers. We treated these both
as “missing data,” so that responses in some categories do not add up to 100%. All categories are missing fewer
than 10% of responses, except household income, which nearly 20% of respondents did not indicate. Past work
suggests that this level of non-response to income questions is distributed across income groups (Moore et al.
2000), and therefore does not significantly impact the description of the sample

very liberal, (2) moderate, or (3) conservative or very conservative. We also over-sampled for
non-Protestant religions. As such, the sample has good variation with respect to political
leaning and religious affiliation, the two most important indicators of difference with respect to
Islam.

Findings: The Criminalization of Muslims
Although about half of our interviews took place before Trump was chosen as the Republican
candidate in July 2016, his proposal to ban Muslims structured most of our conversations.
According to an NVivo search of our interview transcripts, Trump’s name had almost 900
unique mentions, far more than Hillary Clinton (220 mentions), Bernie Sanders (160 mentions), or Ted Cruz (fewer than 50 mentions), even though all of these candidates issued
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statements about Islam. When we asked respondents our first question—what they had heard
the candidates say about Islam—most told us that Trump was proposing to ban Muslims in
order to prevent terrorist attacks. As one respondent in a neighborhood community center
serving low-income senior citizens told us, she’d heard “the one where the Muslims should be
sent out of this country. I mean, let’s get rid of them. Let’s don’t let them in. They’re all bad.”
This was no longer “dog whistle” politics (Rosino and Hughey 2015), using coded language to
signal allegiance to white voters with obtuse language. Our respondents understood that
candidate Donald Trump thought Americans would be safer without Muslims in the country
because they are “all bad.”
After this first question, we prompted respondents to make sense of what they heard from
the candidates, asking: “Why do you think Islam has been an issue in the campaign?” It is from
these responses that most of the data in this paper draws. For this paper, I eventually coded for
three themes. I first was struck by the ubiquitous mention of race and racism, and began
tracking the way racial metaphors were employed. Nearly two-thirds of respondents said
Trump’s proposal was similar to policies targeting other racial minorities. Interviewees spoke
of Japanese-American internment during the Second World War; Jewish genocide during the
Third Reich; and Hispanic immigrants and African-Americans during recent decades to
explain their position on the potential ban. I also marked language describing fear, dissatisfaction, or caution about Muslims or Islam in the United States; and language objecting to
generalizations about the religion and its adherents. To my surprise, most respondents spoke
about Muslims as a problem to be solved, using language that not only homogenized a diverse
group, but also located it as a threat to public safety. As I will describe, 74 out of the 144 nonMuslim respondents employed “racial threat” talk to speculate about Muslims and Islam.
Fewer than half of non-Muslim respondents—70 out of 144—refrained from drawing any
parallels between Islam and dangerousness. While these are not the subject of the current
paper, it is worth describing them briefly, as two sub-groups. The first sub-group was
composed of nine Sikh, Hindu, and self-described Christian Middle Eastern respondents
who feared for their own safety at the hands of anti-Muslim Americans and were trying to
make sense of an historical moment that endangered their well-being. Their stories recall the
experiences of other Americans impacted by the gaze of those who presume, mistakenly, to
“know” them (Dawkins 2012; Sanchez and Schlossberg 2001), discussed in a separate article
(Kaufman and Niner 2019). The second sub-group of respondents who did not speak of
Muslims as a threat (n = 61), were largely college-educated, self-described politically “liberal”
from minority religious and racial groups. Some of these were the quieter members of focus
groups, while others actively objected to generalizations about Islam.9 For example, a Rabbi in
his 70s explained to me that there was no one, unified Islam. Muslims are “very disparate, and
very diverse,” he told me matter-of-factly. “You have all the sub-groups, and they don’t relate
to one another necessarily. They don’t talk about an ‘Islamic people,’ like we talk about a
‘Jewish people.’” A university professor explained that the religion of Islam could not explain
“terrorist” violence. “Islam is a red herring in this stuff,” she said. “If you want to know why
certain groups in the Middle East are murderously angry with the West, look at the politics of
the region. Don’t try to read the Qur’an. That’s just ridiculous.”

9
As one reviewer pointed out, focus group members’ “quietness” on this issue could mean that they were
swayed or cowed by the views of their groupmates. It is possible that these respondents would have expressed
fears about Muslims if interviewed individually.
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The majority of respondents (n = 74), however, spoke about Muslims as if they were a
homogenous and potentially criminal group. As I will describe, they demonstrate concerns
similar to those who fear African Americans and Hispanics. Like past instances of racial threat,
cr-Islamization is multi-faceted. Our respondents frame Muslims as a potential physical threat
on the one hand, and political threat on the other. They then suggest crime control measures
familiar to the mass incarceration era that they would like state agencies to take in order to
control the threat. Notably, less than a third of respondents who criminalize Muslims (n = 23)
reflect the unapologetic anti-Islamic “fringe” discourse that Bail (2012, 2015) describes. The
remaining two-thirds (n = 51) simultaneously oppose Trump’s “racist” exclusion of Muslims
but also wonder whether the presence of Muslims in the United States necessitates increased
crime control measures. As such, cr-Islamization accounts for both “liberal” and “illiberal”
(Mondon and Winter 2017) perspectives.

Fear of Violent Bodies: “It’s the Caution that Has Come About Me”
Like African-Americans and Hispanic migrants, Muslims were described by respondents as physically threatening the safety of American citizens. Fear of terrorist
bombings was widespread among our respondents, and located on the bodies of
Muslim men and women. Thomas, for example, is a black Baptist Democrat and
professional employed in the nonprofit sector. When asked what he had heard from
the presidential candidates about Islam, he said that the proposed ban against Muslims
was akin to a racial bias against blacks like himself. But when asked if he had “fear”
around these issues, he reflected on a contradiction:
I wouldn’t call it fear, but you’re just aware of your surroundings. I don’t know what
they’re called, and excuse me, but you find there’s some of the women that wear the
covering, or certain dress, or whatever … I want to be honest. I hope you understand
the way I phrase this. My caution when I see someone like that really has nothing to
do with their person. I say 90 percent has nothing to do with the person, but it’s the
caution that has come about me because of what I’ve heard that is happened in other
places.
As a black man, Thomas had experienced prejudice due to profiling, yet he admits concern for
his own safety when encountering women wearing what he perceives to be Islamic head
coverings. He discovers this as an uncomfortable contradiction in himself, apologizing and rewording his answers several times. The “caution” that has come about him, he says, is not an
intellectual reaction, but a visceral one. Another interviewee named Amelia encounters a
similar paradox in herself. She describes herself as a Catholic, Latina high school teacher in
her 40s who is politically moderate. She was part of a focus group of teachers, all of whom
were denouncing Trump’s racism. When asked about “fear” directly, however, Amelia selfconsciously examined her behavior when encountering women wearing hijabs. She said:
“I’ve been in Walmart and HEB and I’m just like, ‘Okay, I’m done,’ and I walk out.” She
then said she knew her fear of Muslims was something that she needed to “deal” with
because it was irrational, yet she could not help what she described as an “emotional”
feeling of insecurity.
Both Amelia and Thomas mimic what anti-Islamic groups have said: a hijab worn in the
“West” should be a sign of potential radicalism and considered dangerous. Despite their
acknowledgement of prejudice and its irrationality, they find themselves fearful when they
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encounter signs of the Islamic religion. A white, Baptist minister named William described
similar fear, using language that more clearly reflects anti-Islamic discourse. He asked:
Who is hiding under the blanket? Are they hiding explosive vests? Are they in fact men?
Because some of the terrorists have disguised, over in France, as women with the big
Hajib [sic]. Are they in fact what they appear to be? We don’t know. They choose not to
identify themselves; they are hiding.
For William, Muslim bodies are not only potentially dangerous, they are hidden. This provokes
double anxiety: there is potential physical danger, and William does not know exactly where it
might be. Indeed, the fear of physical closeness to “dangerous” bodies is as old as the creation of
racial categories used to draw distinctions between native “black” and civilized “white” bodies
(Fanon 1952). The hijab is one of the ways that Muslims have been racialized and ostracized in
Western contexts (Byng 2010; Haddad et al. 2006; Selod 2015, 2018). When used in the twentyfirst century context of “threat” and fear of violence, it is also a marker of cr-Islamization.
A woman’s hijab was also evidence of Muslim men’s criminality, especially among the half
dozen white, baby boomer interviewees who identified as feminists. Natalie, a white, political
“moderate” in her 60s, saw Muslim women as victim to “their men’s” tendencies towards
religious violence. She wondered: “What happens with women when they strap a bomb on and
die, unless they’re doing it to be faithful to the man that they have?” In Natalie’s thinking,
Muslim men monopolize violence and use Muslim women to enact it. Like Thomas and
Amelia, interviewees using this kind of logic tended toward self-reflection. Dana had always
worried about Muslim women, she said: “As a “card-carrying feminist my whole life, that’s
really what I focus on.” But she recognized, as we were talking, that this kind of essentializing
might be inconsistent with her other core beliefs. As she said: “I feel like one of the things that
I do, which is really, completely wrong … lump all these countries together.” Karen, quoted in
this paper’s introduction, however, was singularly unselfconscious in talking about Muslim
men’s capacity for violence. In her experience, she explained, Muslim men routinely brutalized
women, killing them with “complete impunity” if “the least little thing went wrong”:
We saw it every day, every single day. A woman was bitten by a rabid dog. Her husband
took her to the clinic. My husband is there. He’s speaking the language so he knows
exactly what’s going on, and so they wanted to give her the rabies shots. Well, that
particular day there were no female vaccinators available ... These women are completely covered. They have to have part of their sleeve cut out so that they could just
vaccinate through their arm. Well that particular husband wouldn’t even agree to that
because it would be a male vaccinator, and so they just left. My husband said, “She’s
going to get rabies.” Then he answered with, “insha’Allah.” God wills it.
This was not an isolated incident, Karen explained. She told us: “I could go on for hours about
the way they treated women.” Muslim men were not only dangerous to Westerners, but
regularly endangered the lives of the women in their communities, in her perspective. This
led Karen to conclude that all Muslim men must be dangerous to women’s interests. Critical
feminists call this “imperial feminism,” white, where Western notions of female empowerment
justify condemnation of Muslim women’s practices (cf. Russo 2006). In this context, however,
the condemnation of Muslim women is also used as a foil to construct Muslim men as the true
locations of violence.
Thus, the threat of Islamic violence was manifest in a distinctly gendered way. According to
our respondents, the hijab is a physical marker of potential violence, while the ideological
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impetus is male. While state policies tend to target men (Selod 2018; Cainkar and Selod 2018),
it is interesting that our respondents find men and women to be sites of potential violence. This
is reminiscent of the ways in which criminality has been gendered more generally. Women are
often constructed as “dupes” or “foils” for the violence inherent in masculinity, especially in
the context of black masculinity (cf. Collins 2004).

Fear of Takeover: “The Best Funded, Financed Group in the History of Groups Like
That”
Other respondents described a more ideological threat emanating from the religion of Islam.
This argument was embodied by Jay, a retired military officer and local leader of an
organization working for anti-Islamic policy as a matter of national security. Jay said that
Islam should be considered a political ideology rather than a religion, a common argument
from anti-Islamic organizations (Bail 2012, 2015). Like communism, Jay explained, Islam is a
threat to Western democracy. Both “movements” had leaders who aim to overthrow Western
governments. The difference between the two was that “Marx didn’t find a religion to be able
to hang his hat on,” but “Muhammed did and it was a very smart, smart strategy.” Muslims
therefore, like people suspected of Marxist or Leninist sympathies, should be targets of mass
enquiry to protect the security of the United States, he argued. Jay’s position constructs Islam
as a dangerous ideology, as singular and identifiable as that of a lone philosopher. It also places
Muslims within the purview of the criminal justice system, as a danger to national security.
William, the Baptist minister, explained that Muslims are in fact one of the most serious threats
to America’s security in history, citing their economic and organizational prowess:
They’re highly technical. They’re probably the best funded, financed group in the
history of groups like that, by taking over other countries with oil fields and things of
that nature. They know how to use social media and the internet to propagandize their
cause and recruit.
For Jay and William and the 21 other respondents who employed similar logic, Islam has an
ideological agenda as clear and nefarious as Karl Marx’s, and an organization as sharp as any
in history.
The Muslim takeover, these respondents explained, will be affected through multiple U.S.
institutions, attacking U.S. religion, law, and education. Marty, a retired intelligence officer and
current staff for a Christian broadcasting network, explained that Islam is a threat to U.S.
Judeo-Christianity. Islam is not only different, but dangerous. Betty, an evangelist missionary,
explained: “Islam is a religion of hate because there is nothing in the Qur’an, not one time ever,
that they talk about a loving God.” A young man recently out of high school elaborated how
the religion itself was a problem. Although he admitted that he did not understand Islam
exactly, he knew it was a threat to Americans. He was “not sure if all Islams [sic] believe
Americans should be murdered,” or if “they believe all people who disagree with their beliefs
should be murdered,” but he concluded, it’s giving Islam “a really bad reputation.” Together,
these three respondents demonstrate a range of potential thinking about the threat of the
Islamic religion: it is foreign to the United States’ Judeo-Christian culture, based in hate,
and poses a direct, deadly threat to “Americans.”
Several other respondents highlighted the role of Sharia—the Islamic code of laws—in the
threat to America. Jay pointed out all that all “real” Muslims must be loyal to both the Qur’an
and Sharia law, and that they could not do this and obey U.S. law at the same time. Marty
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explained that this takeover was already in effect, telling us that there were “over 150 cases” in
the courts that had relied on Sharia law, replacing Muslim ideology for law in “our own justice
system.” This view was not limited to the most conservative respondents. Cora and Camila,
two politically moderate Hispanic retirees in a senior citizens’ community group, explained
that they were worried about Muslims’ ability to be loyal members of the United States.
Speaking of Sharia law, Camila said that its entrance into courts of law demonstrated that
Muslims “want a revolution. They want control.” Cora agreed, adding that she thinks “they
want to take over.” For all of these respondents, the problem was framed as an impossible
dualism of loyalties. One could not believe both in an Islamic religious text and the U.S.
Constitution, they argued.
The threat of Islam was also evident in the education system, our respondents told us. Marty
described how public schools were being “invaded,” and would soon be taken over:
Our schools, public schools, many times are celebrating Ramadan because the Muslims
demanded it. By the time a minority group gets up to 10 percent, they will have enclaves
where no one else other than their own are allowed. It’s happening. … Pretty soon the
majority people lose all of their rights because the minority takes over.
By framing the celebration of Ramadan as a lead-in to the large-scale loss of rights, Marty turns the
idea of freedom of religion on its head. If Islam is allowed in schools, it will displace the majority.
This fear of minority “power” was echoed by others. Michelle, a white homemaker in her 30s, said:
“We’re not saying Pledge of Allegiance in school, but we are doing prayer time for Islam students to
stop school and do prayer … we’re giving them a huge power.” Another evangelical respondent
named Alexander told the members of his focus group how local universities too were at risk. A
member of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)— the U.S.’ largest Muslim civil
liberties organization—had recently given a lecture at a local university, he said. This in itself was
evidence of criminal threat. CAIR, Alexander explained, is an “unindicted co-conspirator” in a case
where Muslim foundation leaders were supporting terrorist activities.10 These sorts of organizations,
he argued, plant the seeds of terrorist thought. His suggestion that non-Christian religious speakers at
colleges should be viewed as evidence of potential violence is particularly notable. American
universities, long seen as bastions of “liberalism,” also become sites of potential criminality. The
term “unindicted co-conspirator” is a legal one, evidence of criminal association. Attaching a
criminal identity to a party that has not been confirmed to be criminal by legal due process
(Ratner 2012; Tayeh 2014), it is similar to a technique of the mass incarceration era—using arrests
without convictions to argue for enhanced criminal sentencing (Roberts 1997; Robbins 2004).
Together, these narratives about religion, law, and education, describe Islam as an advancing and
dangerous threat. Islam’s violence is located in its religious tenets, and evident in its creep into legal
and educational settings. Whoever should become president, Jay said, must be prepared for a “long,
hard fight,” to rid the country of such threats. Importantly, the dangers that respondents describe are
both similar to and distinct from the fear of other racialized bodies in the mass incarceration era. Like
African Americans and Hispanic migrants, Muslims are spoken about as homogenous, violent, and
physically threatening. Yet they are also spoken about as organized, sophisticated, and ideologicallymotivated, qualities not commonly linked with criminalized racial groups in the mass incarceration
era. In the next section, respondents describe crime control techniques that the U.S. government
might deploy in order to protect the American public from such a multi-faceted threat.
The speaker is referring to the “Holy Land Foundation,” the prosecution of which has been fodder for
controversy in both civil liberty and anti-Islamic groups. See Ratner (2012).
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Crime Control Solutions: “For the Protection and Safety of its Citizens”
Samuel and Marley are a self-described white, liberal couple who are politically active; both
had been delegates for the Democratic Party in their local districts. When asked what they heard
about Islam during the campaign, Marley said that Trump’s Muslim ban was a “racist-based
ideology working through our immigration policies.” The couple then took turns listing
minority groups who have likewise been singled out in American history: “Jews were treated
like that. The Irish … the Japanese-Americans, after bombing Pearl Harbor … slavery from
Africa ...” But Samuel then clarifies his position, saying he wants the government to act
“more expertly” to assure Muslims with the potential for terrorist violence are not admitted
to the U.S.:
Saying all of that, however, I think we should expect our government to do things more
expertly when they get into something. Vetting people. I wouldn’t want a Nazi sympathizer
or a former Nazi still practicing his viewpoints allowed to come in without normal vetting.
Samuel wonders whether immigrant “vetting” is strong enough to flush out potential terrorists.
He evokes the metaphor of Nazi sympathizers as an explanation for a threat emanating from
Islam. He wonders whether the government should do something more to assure that Muslims
seeking entrance into the country are not in fact dangerous. Indeed, the language of “vetting”
and border security was raised in a full dozen of the interviews and focus groups we
conducted. Andrew, a liberal white millennial who identifies as an atheist, assures us that he
is against Trump’s proposed ban because he does not think that Muslims are “all terrorists.”
Rather, “there is a certain element to the environment there that allows thoughts to blossom.”
This generalized Muslim “environment” makes extra government screening necessary. Other
respondents put it more bluntly. Alexander says:
It’s not that we’re trying to keep ’em out of the country, but it’s just making sure we
identify the ones we don’t want here … A government’s first and primary responsibility
is for the protection and safety of its citizenry.
This language is similar to contemporaneous media scares about “radicalized” Syrian refugees
who are feared to be sneaking across the border (Bhatia and Jenks 2018). Public fears of crime are
often entwined with media frames; while there is a legion of evidence that immigration does not
cause increased crime (Ousey and Kubrin 2018), for example, popular media outlets are more
likely to cover instances of Hispanic immigrant criminality than conformity, thus fueling the false
notion that immigrants commit more crime than American nationals (Menjívar 2016). Indeed,
scholars who study the “fear of crime industry” point to the media as one of the keys mechanisms
for supplying Americans with evidence of criminal threat (Beckett and Sasson 2004; Glassner
1999; Lee 2001). In the case of cr-Islamization, the media’s influence is likewise apparent.
Other interviewees advocated for criminal justice practices used in urban policing. One of the
prompts available to interviewers was to ask respondents whether they would support “stop and
frisk” policies for Muslims. Responding to this question, Charles, a Hispanic, Catholic Democrat in
his mid-60s responded: “I’m all for frisking Muslims, no matter what! … If they don’t have a
background in terrorism, I want to know.” A conservative professor the same age mentioned a
similar strategy, although without the prompt. Barry explained that he did not support Trump’s
proposal to “close” the borders to Muslims, because it would not be effective. But targeted, increased
scrutiny within U.S. borders, he thought, was necessary.
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If there is a phenomenon of radical jihadists that tend to come for the most part from one
section of the world, and therefore can be identified physically … it doesn’t seem to me
crazy to understand the threat that way.
Arguing that the failure to use sight-based profiling would be “political correctness gone
mad,” Barry says: “We should be able to say something like it was a six-foot black guy
who stole my purse without feeling like we’re somehow being racialist or racist.”
Explicitly drawing together black and Muslim criminality, Barry argues that targeted
population surveillance is a legitimate tool to prevent violence.
Together, these respondents describe crime control techniques they think appropriate
to use in defense against Muslims: penalizing unindicted criminal conspirators, targeted
“vetting” by U.S. border security, and racial profiling in urban settings. These are the
tools of cr-Islamization, borrowed from the criminal justice regime. In a process familiar
to those who study institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), practices
developed as part of the build-up of the mass incarceration era have been adopted by the
U.S. immigration system, and are now also a strategy for distinguishing Muslims as a
new threat to American’s safety.

Discussion and Conclusion
The findings in this paper show that a new criminalization is ascendant in the United
States. Although Muslims have experienced outsider status in the United States since its
founding, Trump’s so-called “Muslim ban” thrust the question of Muslim belonging
into the forefront of public consciousness. Nearly all of our respondents were familiar
with, and opiniated about, the proposal to ban Muslims from coming to the United
States. To make sense of the proposal, they leveraged—explicitly or implicitly—“fear
of crime” arguments familiar to the late mass incarceration era. Our respondents speak
of Muslims as a potential threat in multiple ways. Both male and female bodies are
potential generators of violence. For some, women in public spaces who are “covered”
trigger fear of violence. For others, violence is enacted through female bodies, situating
the ideological threat with Muslim men. Respondents also liken Islam to communism in
its potential to threaten America’s Judeo-Christian culture, its laws, and schools. This
makes Islam not only a threat to American bodies, but to an American way of life.
Techniques from the mass incarceration era are then suggested as tools to combat it:
criminal labels without convictions, increased surveillance and policing, and targeted
interrogation.
Taken together, our respondents constructed Muslims as both foreign and familiar—
rooted in the familiar racial stratification of American bodies, yet alien in their cultural
and ideological identity. Islam’s vilification would not be possible without the U.S.’ long
history of criminalization of black and brown bodies. Our respondents assume that they
can see religion on the bodies of people in the public sphere, just as race has been
constructed to be phenotypically identifiable. As Angela Davis wrote at the height of the
criminalization of black Americans, crime discourse is “one of the masquerades behind
which ‘race,’ with all its menacing ideological complexity, mobilizes old public fears and
creates new ones” (Davis 1997). Joining Hispanic migrants (Bhatia and Jenks 2018;
Chavez 2008; Menjívar 2016; Menjívar and Kil 2002; Romero 2008; Stumpf 2006) and
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African Americans (Collins 2004; Davis 1997; Goffman 2014; Rios 2011) then, Muslims
are talked about as inhabiting dangerous bodies in the public sphere. This fear of
racialized bodies comes not only from white Americans. In the “post-racial” era, the
racial identities of respondents like Thomas and Amelia do not prevent them from
criminalizing Muslims but do provoke self-conscious questioning in response. Scholars
who study racial threat should take note: hegemonic insecurity and cr-Islamization
should not be studied as a project of white America alone. Instead we might ask: how
do intersectional (racial, class, religious) identities impact cr-Islamization?
Cr-Islamization also has features that differentiate it from the criminalization of black
and Hispanic Americans. Williams (2013) argues that Barack Obama’s presidency must
be taken into account when thinking about Muslims’ place in contemporary America: the
President’s very name and body disrupted the hegemonic identities that have historically
limited the American presidency. The Obama Presidency might also be implicated in this
new criminalization of Muslims. Like those who questioned President Obama’s belonging in the U.S., our respondents posit Islamic racial-religious identity as foreign. Like
Hispanic immigrants on the southern border (Chavez 2008), Muslims are described as an
invading force, with a potential for changing American institutions. But unlike Hispanic
immigrants, Muslims’ invasion is religious. To make this claim, a dual erasure in
necessary: notably, our respondents barely mention the black Muslims whose lives and
labors helped build this country during slavery’s rein, nor do they acknowledge that there
are millions of American Muslims who regularly negotiate the posed “conflict” between
religious and secular commitments. Islam has been a part of the country’s religious
make-up since its founding.
Also unlike the criminality discourse surrounding blacks and Hispanics, our interviewees describe the Muslim threat as well-financed, sophisticated, and ideologicallymotivated. This might be explained as a type of political and cultural insecurity
stemming from Muslim’s relatively high socio-economic status in the United States.
While black Americans became part of the United States largely through enslavement,
and Hispanics as economically disadvantaged migrants, a large portion of Muslims
migrated to the United States as middle-class professionals.11 This suggests a need to
re-examine the ways in which criminalization works in tangent with economic
exploitation.
The criminalization of Muslims is now a part of the American landscape. Others
should make use of sociology’s extensive engagement with criminalization theory to
reexamine its relationship to racialization, economic exploitation, and religious subjugation, and to document how the perceived social problem of Islam’s incompatibility with
the West serves state power. This is especially important during a time when Islam’s
professed threat provides fodder for political gain. One of the most powerful elements of
criminalization discourse is its nominal commitment to democracy, by subjugating those
perceived to threaten it (Aas and Bosworth 2013; Hirschfield and Celinska 2011; Lyons
and Drew 2006; Lerman and Weaver 2014). Cr-Islamization then, like the criminalization
of African-Americans, Hispanics, and immigrants, has consequences not only for those
perceived to threaten democracy, but for those who hope that the U.S. democracy will
survive its racist origins.
11
See for example, Casanova (2007) on comparisons between E.U. and U.S. religious group immigration
patterns.
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Appendix: Interview Guide
Engagement Questions
1) Tell me a little about yourself ... anything you think is important.
2) Where do you get your news?

Political Rhetoric
3) In the Presidential campaign, there’s been a lot said about Islam. What have you heard?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Are these issues being talked about in your social network?
When was the last time you heard a conversation about Islam?
Why do you think Islam is an issue in the campaign?
How much has the campaign affected your thinking?

Attitude Questions
4) Does this discussion around Islam remind you of any other political conversation in
history?
#5, 6, and 7 IF NECESSARY:
5) Do you remember hearing about this story? A few weeks ago, young man had boarded a
plane on Southwest Airlines when he was overheard speaking Arabic on the phone. A
passenger alerted a crew member, and the young man was escorted off the plane and not
allowed to fly. It was later confirmed that he was a U.S. citizen with no links to any
terrorist organization. How would you feel if you witnessed this?
6) And do you remember this? A young couple, one American-born and the other Pakistanborn, shoot up a room full of people in San Bernardino, California, killing 14 and
injuring 28 others. The FBI calls them “homegrown terrorists,” motivated by sympathy
with extremist Islamic groups. They were not shown to have any official ties to terrorists
groups. Do you think this is different from other mass shootings in the U.S.?
7) There is an argument that the police in the United States should be able to “stop and frisk”
people they find suspicious. What do you think of this policy and would you support a
similar policy for Muslims?

Personal History Question
8) I’m curious about how you’ve formulated your ideas about Islam.
a. Do you know any Muslims?
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b. Can you remember how old you were when you first heard about Islam talked about
in politics?
c. Has your (education, church group, social group) been influential?
d. How do your opinions compare to your parents’ or other (community groups or the
nation)?
9) Have you ever experienced fear around these issues?

Exit Question
10) Is there anything else I should have asked you or you would like to tell us about Islam or
the election?
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